
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5 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: See	DISTRIBUTION
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FROM:

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Director, Office of Community Coordination

SUBJECT:

SSCI Questions for the Record

- 1. As is their practice, the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has provided an advance copy of the questions they have suggested be put to Administration witnesses at the functional overview session currently scheduled for 10 March. The questions are attached at Tab A.
- 2. The SSCI staff has stated that the questions are in draft and are subject to change. Despite that, they wanted to give us a chance to see the questions and begin preparing answers. Those that are not asked in the hearing will need responses for the record. Further, response time is short due to compressed schedules this session. If possible they would like to have the written responses delivered within 48 hours after the hearing has taken place.
- 3. I have noted in the margin, before each question, the IC Staff office responsible for assembling or seeing that the response is assembled. The office indicated should undertake all activities connected with a complete response:
 - a. assembling the information,
 - b. interacting with appropriate elements of the Community who should participate in the response,
 - c. drafting the response
 - d. coordination or comment as required, and
 - e. final production in the format at Tab B.

Some of the questions obviously involve more than one office. I have attempted to assign action to the office which appears to have a primary interest in a particular subject. Should you want to participate in preparing a response assigned to someone else, please communicate directly with the office having primary action.

4. Please remember that you are expressing the views of specific witnesses—in this case Admiral Inman and They will need to have 25X
time to review your completed work before it is sent to the Congress. Please
provide your proposed response in the format shown at Tab B 25X
OCC/LL by noon, Wednesday, 10 March.
Attachments:
Tab A. SSCI Questions 25X
Tab B. Format
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
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DCI OVERVIEW

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

General

- OP
- 1. In order for the Committee to make rational decisions about the Community's resource needs, it is important for us to understand the major challenges facing intelligence over the longterm, and the adequacy of current capabilities.
 - A. What are the key policy issues or trends that will most influence the scope and direction of intelligence during the next five to ten years?
 - B. What are the key weaknesses that you foresee in the Intelligence Community's ability to meet these challenges?
 - C. What major new initiative will be required to enable the Community to adequately address these challenges?
 - D. Do Administration budget forecasts provide sufficient flexibility to fund these initiatives?
- OP
- 2. For some time now, the Committee has expressed concern about the lack of a long-range strategic perspective within which to weigh investment planning for U.S. intelligence.
 - A. What progress has been achieved during the past year in establishing a comprehensive, long-range strategic planning process within the Intelligence Community?



B. Could you provide some specific examples of how long-range strategic policy concerns have been translated into resource decisions in the FY 1983 budget process?

OF

- 3. Evidence suggests that competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will grow in the years ahead.
 - A. In your view, what are the most likely areas of increased competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?
 - B. What are the major long-term intelligence problems facing the Community with respect to the Soviet threat?
 - C. In which of these areas does there currently exist a moderate to high degree of uncertainty in our assessment of the nature or extent of the threat?
 - D. What specific actions have been proposed in the FY 1983 budget to improve our capabilities in these areas?

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- 4. Developments in the Third World, and global issues are becoming increasingly important to our strategic interests.
 - A. What is your assessment of how well the Community is able to address these problems?
 - B. In which of these areas is the Community least able to adequately meet policymakers' needs?

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- C. What specific actions have been proposed in the FY 1983 budget to overcome these weaknesses?
- 5. Recent crises have demonstrated a lack of robustness in the U.S. intelligence system to be able to respond to multiple crises and continue to maintain coverage of other high priority targets.
 - A. What improvements are needed to strengthen the intelligence system so that it can respond to crises without major losses against other high priority needs?
 - B. What specific actions have been proposed in the FY 1983 budget to improve our flexibility?
- 6. For some time now, the Committee has been urging the Community to improve its overall management and direction of Automatic Data Processing activities. Several major new ADP systems are currently under development which are extremely complex and will require a substantial investment over the next few years.
 - A. What mechanisms presently exist at the DCI level to review ADP proposals and developments across the community?
 - B. In your view, are current arrangements adequate to insure an integrated and cost-effective approach to ADP throughout the Community?

- C. Are your statisfied that current mechanisms will provide adequate management attention to insure that these major new ADP initiatives meet schedule, cost and performance goals?
- D. If not, what specific steps would you recommend to strengthen and improve present arrangements?
- 7. The Fiscal Year 1983 budget request represents a growth about 25 percent over last year.

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- A. What specific improvements identified in the capabilities study have been funded in the FY 1983 budget request? At what cost?
- B. What criteria was used to determine which capabilities improvements would be funded in FY 1983?
- C. What is the relative priority and cost of planned capabilities improvements over the next five years?
- D. In the event Congress decides to reduce overall defense spending in FY 1983, what intelligence activities could be curtailed with least impact?

Collection

- 8. For the most part, intelligence collection capabilities have been designed to operate in a relatively benign environment.
 - A. Under current planning, against what level of conflict are major technical collection assets expected to survive attack?

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- B. What specific steps have been taken or are planned to improve the survivability of collection assets in the event of attack?
- C. What contingency plans exist for transferring control of national collection assets to the Department of Defense in the event of war? How frequently are these plans exercised?
- D. What contingency plans have been developed for integrating civilian intelligence personnel into the military in wartime?
- 9. In recent years, a number of the major technical collection systems have been compromised.
- OCCICS A. What is the Community's assessment of the extent to which U.S. technical collection systems have been compromised? With what impact?
 - B. What steps have been taken or are planned to minimize the impact of these compromises? To insure against further compromising these systems?
 - C. Is there any evidence of Soviet attempts to influence our collection efforts either through misinformation or electronic means that we have uncovered?
 - D. What measures could the Soviets take -- short of direct attack -- if they were determined to deceive or dis-rupt our collection effort? What counter-measures could

be employed to guard against such actions?

- OLAE
- 10. It is our understanding that the Administration is currently re-examining U.S. space policy.
 - A. What is the status of this effort?
 - B. What conclusions, if any, have been reached thus far regarding future U.S. space policy?
 - C. How and to what extent will these conclusions impact intelligence space system planning?
- OJAE
- 11. The Committee continues to have reservations about current plans for transitioning U.S. Reconnaissance Systems to the space shuttle.
 - A. How confident are you that the shuttle will meet its projected milestones and long-term performance goals?
 - B. Which major systems will have been committed to launch solely by the space shuttle by November 1982?
 - C. Are you confident that current planning provides an adequate hedge against unacceptable gaps or degradation in mission coverage should the shuttle experience unanticipated problems?
 - D. In your view, should the U.S. depend solely on the space shuttle as the only means of launching space missions in the future?

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12. Last year the Committee requested the Community to examine the benefits of a common, more flexible upper stage -- like the Centaur -- that could be utilized with both expendable boosters and the space shuttle. It is our understanding that after detailed examination, and despite a major improvement in capability and significant potential long-term savings, the Administration has decided to terminate further Centaur development.

- A. What was the rationale for the Administration's decision to terminate Centaur development?
- B. What was the Intelligence Community's role in the examiniation of this issue?
- C. Did your position agree with the final outcome? If so, why?
- 13. Clandestine human source collection is an important part of the overall U.S. intelligence effort.
 - A. How successful are clandestine human source collection operations in acquiring information that fills critical gaps in our knowledge as opposed to confirming information or information of little consequence? Could you provide some specific examples?
 - B. In your view, have our clandestine human source collection efforts become too dependent upon access to ruling elites and intelligence liaison relationships?

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- C. To what extent do self-imposed administrative or operational constraints impede clandestine human source collection efforts abroad?
- D. What contingency plans exist to insure worldwide human source collection will continue at an acceptable level in wartime?
- E. What progress has been made during the past year in expanding non-official cover for clandestine collection officials abroad?
- 14. The community has been criticized from time to time for collecting far more than can be effectively utilized. This is particularly true in the area of signals collection, where a number of new initiatives will substantially expand our signal collection capabilities over the next few years.
 - A. In your view, is this a valid criticism?
 - B. How successful have we been in developing effective means for dealing with the volume of signals collected?
 - C. Are signals processing systems accorded sufficiently high priority in our planning to insure that we get full advantage from our collection efforts?
 - D. Should consideration be given to altering our philosophy and approach to signals collection?

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- 15. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are continuing to employ new and exotic electronics techniques to command their military forces.
 - A. What is your assessment of the U.S. capability to keep pace with these changes?
 - B. What are the major gaps and deficiencies in our SIGINT capabilities to collect against these signals?
 - C. How has the reorganization of the Soviet command and control structure impacted our signals collection capabilities?
 - D. What specific actions have been proposed in the FY 1983 budget to overcome these deficiencies?

systems? Are current mechanisms adequate?

D. Will planned military satellite communications systems provide adequate survivability to insure uninterrupted service for intelligence mission in wartime? If not, what actions are being taken to improve the survivability of these systems?

-11-

ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

	17. The Committee has been particularly concerned about the
OPBC	quality of analysis during the past few years, and has encouraged
	and strongly supported improvements in this area. We note, however,
	that despite an increase in the budget
	only a modest increase is proposed for improvements in anlaysis
	and production activities. By far the largest share of the
	increased investment is for new collection initiatives.

- A What is the rationale for this apparent mismatch in funding priorities?
- B. What specific actions are planned to prevent the analysts from becoming further inundated with raw intelligence data from the new collection initiatives proposed in the budget?
- C. How confident are you that these actions will enable the analysts to cope effectively with the volume of information with which they will be faced in the midto-late 1980s?
- SAD1518. Competitive analysis can be a useful tool in ensuring that policymakers receive the benefit of differing points of view and interpretations in finished intelligence.
 - A. In your view, what is the proper role and value of competitive analysis in the production of finished intelligence?
 - B. Are there specific areas where finished intelligence would benefit more from competitive analysis than others?

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
- C. Are there certain areas where competitive analysis would not be desirable or worthwhile?
- D. What actions have been taken during the past year to ensure that competing viewpoints are articulated in finished intelligence reaching policymakers?
- 19. It is our understanding that an agreement was recently reached with the Defense Department on the role of the intelligence community in the net assessment of foreign military threats.
 - A. Could you describe the intelligence community's role in net assessments under this agreement?
 - B. How does this differ from present arrangements?
 - C. In your view, does the new agreement provide an adequate role for the intelligence community?

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- A. Do you share this assessment of the adequacy of our military data bases?
- B. Do military requirements enjoy a high enough priority to compete in the allocation of resources necessary to

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fill these deficiencies?

- C. Are the requirements so pervasive that they can never be satisfied adequately regardless of priority assigned to them?
- D. What progress has been achieved in establishing a minimum essential military data base for each country? Is this still a viable and active objective?
- 21. The community has indicated for the past two years that our capabilities with respect to nuclear proliferation were inadequate. The President issued a directive last year which called for the development of a strong intelligence capability for analysis and collection in this area. This year in the budget request the DCI assesses the community's nuclear proliferation capabilities as generally adequate.
 - A. What specific improvements were achieved during the past year that resulted in our nuclear proliferation capabilities going from inadequate to generally adequate?
 - B. What specific actions were taken in response to the President's directive?
 - C. What steps are planned to improve the community's data base on the plans and intentions of potential nuclear weapons states?
 - D. To what extent is the community examining the geopolitical implications of nuclear proliferation as contrasted with the scientific and technical dimensions of the issue?

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22. A number of recent events have highlighted the importance of economic intelligence to U.S. foreign policy.

- A. What is your assessment of the quality of the community's economic intelligence? Couldyou provide some examples where it has been particularly good? Notably lacking?
- B. What are the major weaknesses in the community's economic analysis capabilities?
- C. How does the economic intelligence effort on the Soviet
 Union and eastern Europe compare with efforts on other
 targets?
- economic analysis at-CIA?
- 23. Substantially increased funding is proposed in the FY 1983 budget for external analysis.
 - A. What mechanisms exist within the community to evaluate the quality of external analysis? Are existing arrangements adequate?
 - B. Have any community studies been undertaken to examine the quality and value of external analysis?
 - C. In general, how does the quality of external analysis compare with analysis performed within the community?
 - D. Are there specific analytic tasks where external analysis is particularly important to the community's performance?


 Areas where external analysis efforts have been notably unsuccessful or unsatisfactory?

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Counterintelligence

- Each entity in the Intelligence Community which deals with counterintelligence -- except the U.S. Army -- defines the threat from hostile intelligence services according to its own particilar program. For example, the FBI's budget justification defines the threat primarily in terms of counter-HUMINT in the U.S. But the threat from hostile intelligence services does not respect our bureaucratic boundaries. Any competent hostile service can be expected to coordinate its human and technical collection, its deception, and its covert action against us. Therefore, we need a comprehensive and continuing analysis of the hostile intelligence threat; and each of the CI entities' programs should be developed to meet part of that threat.
 - A. Can each entity do competent CI work if its plans are not based on an analysis of the threat that is as comprehensive as the threat itself?
 - Why is it so hard for the Community to establish at В. least centralized analysis of intelligence to discover anomalies or other matters of CI interest?
 - What is being done to develop a truly "multi-disciplinary" counterintelligence effort against hostile SIGINT, reconnaissance, and other technical collection threats?
 - Is there a need for greater coordination of operational D. security programs between agencies and with other counterintelligence activities?



E. Who is responsible for ensuring that the full range of U.S. countermeasures against the hostile intelligence threat -- including communications security, personnel security, and other defensive security programs -- are effective? The DCI? The President's National Security Advisor?

- 8cc
- 25. The only Community-wide assessment of the total threat is produced by a 5-man Interagency Counterintelligence Staff.

 It also is responsible for determining when CI matters "fall between the cracks" of other agencies' jurisdictions. This staff will soon lose its experienced CIA, FBI, and military detailees.
 - A. What should this staff do, what powers should and shouldn't it have, and how many people are needed to carry out its functions? Are five people adequate?
 - B. Last year the annual CI assessment was submitted before the budget hearings as requested by the Committee, but this year it has not been. Can we count on getting it in time for our hearings next year?
- the intelligence budget, but no increase in resources for the FBI foreign counterintelligence program. During the past 3 years

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
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The ratio of Communist bloc officials to FBI agents changed from about 2-to-1 in 1979 to 3-to-1 in 1981.

- A. How does the Administration justify its decision not to request additional resources for the FBI foreign counterintelligence program?
- B. Is the Administration considering the possibility of a budget amendment that would provide for a substantial enhancement of FBI capabilities in this field?
- 27. Last year the DCI's special report to the Committee on technology transfer problems said that resources in this field were inadequate and that the Intelligence Community was not getting full cooperation from other agencies in providing information needed for foreign intelligence assessment and counterintelligence purposes.
 - A. How far have we come in finding sufficient resources to assign to the technology transfer problem?
 - B. Would any legislation be helpful to overcome the reluctance of other agencies to provide information to the CIA or FBI in this field?

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- C. Is our national intelligence and CI organization capable of analyzing Soviet technology needs, identifying the most likely targets for hostile clandestine collection, and using that analysis to cue our defensive security and aggressive counterintelligence measures?
- D. How good is our coverage of technology loss to the Soviets in Europe and Japan? How effective have our CI countermeasures been? What improvements are being made?
- 28. In January the President established a new Interagency Group to provide direction for counterintelligence at the highest level. It is supposed to be chaired by a representative of either the FBI Director or the CIA Director, depending on guidelines set by a "Senior" Interagency Group chaired by the CIA Director. In the past the Committee has strongly encouraged that such a high-level group convene under the President's National Security Adviser, so that neither the FBI's or the CIA's jurisdiction is altered.
 - A. Why don't both common sense and the National Security
 Act of 1947 point to the President's National Security
 Advisor, rather than the CIA Director, as the chairman
 of an interagency group that spans both FBI and CIA
 responsibilities?
 - B. Is the Attorney General represented on these groups?



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- C. How many times has the Interagency Group met to address counterintelligence matters? [We have been advised that there have been NO such meetings.]

 What difficulties stand in the way?
- D. Last year the national CI threat assessment pointed out significant policy problems requiring decision at the NSC or Presidential level. Examples are the

What is going to

be done to address these problems?

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SSCI Questions for the Record Functional Overview 10 March 1982

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